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This paper analyses how spouses in older couples react to `shocks' or `surprises'
in their partner's labour income using data from the British Household Panel Survey,
1991{2004. Wives' labour supply proves to be much more sensitive to shocks than
husbands'. After a divorce or separation, wives reduce their labour supply while the
eect on husbands' labour supply is positive or not statistically signicant. If a wife
becomes unemployed, it does not aect her husband's labour supply while wives whose
husband becomes unemployed reduce their labour supply, too. A decline in husband's
health causes the wife to reduce her working hours while husbands tend to increase
their labour supply when facing a decline in wife's health. Partner's death does not
have statistically signicant labour supply eects. Negative income shocks due to other
reasons (such as choice) tend to reduce partner's labour supply and vice versa, but only
slightly.
Keywords: Labour supply, income shocks, older couples, BHPS
JEL Classications: J12, J14, J16, J26
R esum e
Nous analysons comment, parmi les couples ^ ag es, les conjoints r eagissent aux chocs
des revenus du travail de leur partenaire en nous appuyant sur les donn ees de l'enqu^ ete
longitudinale des m enages britanniques (BHPS). Apr es une s eparation ou un divorce,
les femmes r eduisent leur ore de travail alors que l'activit e de leurs maris n'appara^ t
pas signicativement aect ee. L'ore de travail des hommes ne semble pas aect ee par
la perte de l'emploi de leurs  epouses, alors que dans le cas o u les hommes perdent leur
emploi, on observe aussi une baisse signicative de l'ore de travail de leurs  epouses.
Une d et erioration de la sant e des hommes entra^ ne une r eduction de l'ore de travail de
leurs  epouses alors que la d et erioration de l' etat de sant e des femmes est accompagn ee
d'une hausse de l'ore de travail de leurs maris. Le d ec es du conjoint ne produit aucun
eet statistiquement signicatif sur l'ore de travail.
21 Introduction
The labour supply of older couples is attracting more and more interest as policy-makers
attempt to increase the labour market participation of older people and postpone the average
retirement age.
Of particular interest are the interactions within couples' labour supply, that is, how one
spouse's labour supply aects partner's labour supply. Understanding these interactions is
important in order to assess the consequences of phenomena such as increases in women's
state pension age and in demographic risks or decreases in career stability.
In the United Kingdom, the state pension age for women is 60 while for men it is 65.
The state pension age for women will rise to 65 between 2010 and 2020. How will older men
in 5 or 10 years' time respond to the later retirement of their wives?
On a related issue, Campbell (1999) shows that older men's employment rates have
declined substantially in Britain, while that of older women increased. Even though there
has recently been a reversal in older men's employment rates, as demonstrated by Disney
and Hawkes (2003: 21{22), it is not yet clear whether earlier levels will be reached again.
Work income as a share of older people's total income has been falling in the UK (OECD
2000: 44). The labour supply consequences of these changes on the individual concerned as
well as on his or her partner are not immediately clear.
As far as demographic risks are concerned, it is important to point out that the divorce
rate among the 40 to 60 year olds is rising, which is dierent from the overall trend (cf. table
1). This implies an increasing number of older men and women losing partner's income and
perhaps having to respond to this loss.
I consider the following research questions in this paper: what are the eects of un-
expected changes in partner's income (which may have happened simultaneously with a
demographic shock, such as a divorce) on the labour supply of older married or cohabiting
3Husbands Wives
All ages 0.97 0.97
Age 40{44 1.16 1.15
Age 45{49 1.15 1.16
Age 50{59 1.25 1.23
Age 60 and over 0.94 0.86
Table 1: 1998 divorce rate (divorces per 1,000 married in the corresponding age group)
divided by 1985 divorce rate.
Calculated from National Statistics PV9841B, Internet: http://www.statistics.gov.uk/
STATBASE/Product.asp?vlnk=4491.
men and women in the United Kingdom? Does the cause of the income shock make a dif-
ference? Are these eects symmetric or not, in the sense that husbands react to changes in
their wife's income in the same way as vice versa? If not, what may be the reason for the
asymmetries?
In order to address these questions, I build upon the methodological framework of Haurin
(1989). While a lot of work has been done on explicit modelling of joint retirement, either
in structural models which estimate the parameters of a particular couple utility function
(cf. for instance Gustman and Steinmeier 2004) or in reduced-form hazard regression models
which model the discrete choice of the couple over all possible combinations of employment
statuses (cf. for instance Blau 1998) and, while these authors nd strong interdependencies in
older couples' labour market decisions, these models cannot directly address how unexpected
changes aecting only one spouse are transmitted to the partner. Moreover, they treat
couples as a single decision unit, implying that they cannot address spousal interactions
in labour supply. For the same reason, these models have to focus on stable couples and,
therefore, cannot incorporate demographic instability; when looking at older people, this
means not only ignoring divorce and separation but also widowhood.
Haurin (1989), contrary to this other work, explicitly focused on the eects of labour
market shocks to one member in a couple on the labour supply of his or her partner. Gen-
4erally speaking, `shocks' (or, as Weiss and Willis, 1997, call them, `surprises') are dierences
between actual and predicted values. In Haurin's (1989) article, these are deviations of hus-
band's actual income from its predicted value which have been caused by an hours shock to
the husband. A positive shock is dened to occur if the husband earns more than predicted
due to working more than predicted; a negative shock occurs if he earns less due to work-
ing less. This methodology has the advantage that xed person- and couple-specic eects
cancel out since Haurin only analyses changes. Moreover, it allows to look directly at the
transmission mechanism of a shock to one individual on the labour supply of the partner.
Haurin (1989) estimates the impact of such shocks on changes in the wife's non-labour
hours (`leisure') between 1981 and 1982 while also controlling for (changes in) city size,
the number of children in the household, the number of other household members, assets,
respondent's health status, and respondent's and husband's wage (treated as endogenous).
He nds that women tend to increase their labour supply substantially after a divorce or
separation. He does not nd statistically signicant eects on wife's labour supply for other
event types (such as a health decline of the partner).
This paper builds upon Haurin's research to analyse how labour market shocks and
demographic shocks aect the labour supply of older couples in the United Kingdom. There
are several contributions of this study compared to Haurin's work:
First, while Haurin only analyses the eects of men's shocks on women's labour supply, I
analyse shocks in both directions to be able to see whether the eects are symmetric or not.
It has been common to focus exclusively on women's labour supply, assuming that husbands
will usually be employed full-time and that the reasons for husbands' hours changes are
exogenous and involuntary (i.e., labour demand side related). Gustman and Steinmeier
(2004) for instance emphasise that the husband is more strongly inuenced by the wife's
retirement decision than the other way around. This may be because of gender roles, perhaps
indicating that the husband does not want to retire before the wife. One of my aims is to
5see whether such a view is appropriate for contemporary UK or not. (The following section
of this paper will cover the theoretical arguments in more detail.)
Second, I analyse the eects of labour income shocks as a whole rather than only labour
income shocks due to hours changes. The rationale for this specication will be given in the
next section. Decomposing the labour income shock into hours shock and wage rate shock
is left as a topic for future work.
Third, while Haurin analyses all working women, I focus on older people, specically on
couples where both partners are aged 40 to 70. Starting from age 40 is useful since there are
rst increases in labour market exit rates and decreases in return rates to the labour market
between ages 40 and 50 (cf. Haardt 2006: Figures 2 and 3, pp. 19 and 20).
Fourth, I emphasise the importance of dynamics in the econometric model. To this end, I
employ the Arellano-Bond (1991) GMM dynamic panel estimator which was not yet available
at the time of Haurin's paper.
Fifth and last, I analyse the United Kingdom between 1991 and 2004 (using data from the
British Household Panel Survey, BHPS) while Haurin analysed the United States between
1981 and 1982. To my knowledge, a similar analysis has not yet been carried out for the UK.
My data are more recent and cover a longer time span which, together with the Arellano-
Bond framework, allows to model the labour supply adjustment process over time in a more
comprehensive way.
Section 2 of this paper gives an overview of the theoretical background on within-couple
shocks. Section 3 describes the methodology in more detail and Section 4 the data. Section
5 presents and discusses the regression results. Section 6 draws some conclusions.
62 Theoretical background
The eects of husband's unemployment on wife's labour supply have been subject of much
research (research on the eects in the opposite direction has been rather limited, for reasons
discussed in the introduction). Most of this research has focused on the question whether a
so-called `added worker eect' (AWE) or an opposite `discouraged worker eect' (DWE) can
be observed in the data.
An AWE is present if the wife compensates for the income loss associated with husband's
unemployment by increasing her labour supply. A DWE, on the other hand, is present
if husband's unemployment does in fact have the opposite eect by conveying a signal of
dicult labour market conditions to the wife.1
Another aspect which should not be forgot, and which may have implications for the
symmetry or asymmetry of the eects of shocks, are gender roles. Sociologists suggest that
men who have become unemployed may put pressure on their wives to reduce, or at least
not increase, their labour supply, since having the wife take over the breadwinner role may
be detrimental to the husband's self-esteem. Also wives themselves may be opposed to
becoming the breadwinner.2
In the United Kingdom, the eects of the benet system have attracted a lot of attention
in this topic area. A substantial and growing part of benets in the UK are means-tested,
constituting a considerable disincentive to work once one spouse has become unemployed.
Bingley and Walker (2001: 159) point out `that the labour supply disincentives from the
welfare system facing women married to men who remain unemployed are made signicantly
worse by the reform [of the Jobseeker's Allowance]'.3 There is now a consensus that the UK
1Cf. Bingley and Walker (2001: 157{158) for a brief introduction to the AWE and DWE literature.
2McKee and Bell (1985) interviewed couples with an unemployed husband, nding that many husbands
and wives opposed the wife becoming the breadwinner.
3In 1996, the Jobseeker's Allowance was introduced, replacing the Unemployment Benet. This implied
a reliance on family means-tested benets after six months (if the individual had made enough contributions
for contributory Jobseeker's Allowance) or even earlier than that (in the case of insucient contributions.)
7benet system increases the risk of women married to men who became unemployed to leave
the labour market, too.
The empirical evidence for the USA is mixed, with some authors nding evidence for an
AWE and others not. There is not too much research using panel data, and even less cross-
national comparative research. McGinnity (2002: 473) compared the UK and Germany using
panel data, nding `some evidence of an added-worker eect in Germany' but the results
`suggest a disincentive eect of means-tested benet on partners' employment in Britain'.
Haurin (1989: 59) found, for the USA, no statistically signicant eect whatsoever of
husband's unemployment or bad health on wife's labour supply. However, he does nd
evidence for what we may call an AWE after divorce or separation: `If the woman worked
960 hours in 1981, the increase in work time for those women recently divorced or separated
is 540 hours, while the estimate for widows indicates a slight decline in work time' (but the
latter estimate is not statistically signicant at any reasonable level).
The analysis of the eects of an individual's labour-market shocks on the partner, of
AWE versus DWE, could be done in several ways. Haurin (1989) looked at the eects of
partner's income shocks which are due to partner's hours changes on own hours. One could
also look at the eects of partner's income shocks on own income. In any case, a dynamic
model which analyses changes seems to be appropriate.
I analyse the eects of partner's income shocks on own hours, rather than the two other
options just mentioned. I am mainly interested in the eects which income shocks have due
to the income change as such, not due to the underlying hours change (moreover, a shock
may also come about due to a change in the wage rate). This is the reason why I analyse
income shocks. As far as the outcome variable is concerned, income is not something which
people can readily choose|in most cases, the response will be working more hours, even
though there may also be changes to higher wage jobs. This is why I analyse the eects on
hours rather than on income.
8The following section presents the model I use to analyse the eects of these income
shocks to one member of a couple on his or her partner's working hours.
3 Econometric model
A simple econometric model based on the theoretical background just introduced may take
the form
hi;t = wi;t + P;t + i + i;t; (1)
where the dependent variable h is hours, w the vector of explanatory variables excluding the
shock variable,  the corresponding coecient vector,  partner's income shock, and  the
coecient of the shock variable. Finally,  and  are error terms (as the subscripts indicate,
 is time-constant for each individual while  is the standard i.i.d. error term).
Equation 1 raises a number of questions. Which variables are important to be included
in w? Are all elements of w exogenous? What if some are not? Which sign does  have,
that is, are income shocks to one individual magnied or oset by his or her partner's labour
supply? Does  have the same size for the eect of husband's shock on wife's hours as vice
versa? Does  vary depending on the cause of the income shock? Are typical hours reactions
large enough to matter? Do only contemporaneous right-hand side variables matter or also
lagged values? What about lagged values of the dependent variable?
A highly exible framework which allows taking these issues into consideration is the
dynamic panel data model by Arellano and Bond (1991). It starts from a generalised version
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9where we now have three vectors of explanatory variables and three corresponding coe-
cient vectors rather than just w and . First, x, the vector of strictly exogenous variables
(incorporating, among others, ), second, y, the vector of non-endogenous predetermined
variables, and third, z, the vector of endogenous predetermined variables. The dierence
between these three vectors will be discussed shortly.
The three vectors of explanatory variables, as well as the dependent variable, may appear
with dierent numbers of lags: n is the number of lags of the dependent variable while o,
p, and q are the numbers of lags of the three vectors of explanatory variables. The model














zi;t m3m + i;t; (3)
which removes the  term. Technically, the dierence between strictly exogenous variables,
non-endogenous predetermined variables, and endogenous predetermined variables is that
while x are their own instruments, yt 1 to yT are used as instruments for y and zt 2 to
zT as instruments for z. In other words, `the more endogenous' a variable, the further we
go back in time to get our instruments.
The decision which variables belong to which group is entirely up to the researcher. Apart
from theoretical considerations, the Sargan test (cf. Arellano and Bond, 1991) can be used
to test for exogeneity of x. The explanatory variables themselves as well as the numbers of
lags are of course also chosen by the researcher. I will discuss my decisions in that respect
in the following section of this paper, which presents the data and variables used, including
a detailed presentation of the shock variables.
104 Data, sample selection criteria, and variables
4.1 Data
The data which I use are from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), a longitudinal
survey of households with detailed socio-demographic and economic information. The indi-
viduals of a representative sample of 5,500 British households were rst interviewed in 1991
and have been followed since then, with data from 14 waves (annual interviews) currently
available (cf. Taylor 2006). In this paper, I use waves 1{13. The BHPS provides me with
a large and reliable sample of older couples, interviewed between autumn 1991 and spring
2004 (since 6.4% of the interviews of wave 13 were carried out in spring 2004).
The analysis sample which I use for my regressions contains 974 couples and a total of
7,543 person-years (3,788 person-years for the inuence of husbands on their wife, 3,755 for
the opposite direction).4 Haurin (1989: 57) had a sample of 800 women (or 1,600 person-
years).
4.2 Sample selection criteria
First, I only analyse couples where both partners are aged 40 to 70 since the focus of this
paper is on older people. As mentioned before, I use age 40 as the lower bound since one
can see a rst increase in the exit rate out of employment between age 40 and 50, and age
70 as the upper bound since there is only very little labour market activity beyond this age.
Tables 2 and 3 summarise the partnership and work patterns in t 1 in pairs of subsequent
BHPS waves. This shows that most people in the age group 40{70 do have a partner.
Table 4 shows work patterns among older couples using pooled data and conrms that
the probability of working is much smaller if the partner does not work. In most couples,
4The dierence in the number of person-years stems from dierent numbers of missing values in the health
variable and the education variables across sexes, as well as from dierential follow-up in the subsequent
wave.
11partner present no partner
respondent working 8,888 3,609
respondent not working 5,881 3,950
Table 2: Partnership and work patterns (in person-years) in t 1 for subsequent wave pairs
of female respondents (pooled person-wave data using BHPS waves 1{13).
partner present no partner
respondent working 10,121 1,732
respondent not working 4,982 1,560
Table 3: Partnership and work patterns (in person-years) in t 1 for subsequent wave pairs
of male respondents (pooled person-wave data using BHPS waves 1{13).
either both spouses work or neither of them. Moreover, we can see that most couples in this
age group are couples where both spouses work. This is why I will focus on this group of the
population in my analysis. (I focus on a single group since the change in working hours may
follow a dierent pattern depending on whether or not somebody works in the rst place.)
Second, there is a small number of observations where the person whom the respondent
mentions as the partner does not mention the respondent as their partner. Closer inves-
tigation showed that these cases are due to dierent interview dates of the two spouses in
question, with a partner change in between. I drop these observations since there are only
very few of them and since it would not be clear how to handle them properly.
Third, I can of course only use those observations where all the variables of my analysis
have non-missing values. To this end, I made sure to use only variables which have low
numbers of missing values. One important variable which has an above average proportion
of missing observations is health status. I interpolate and extrapolate year-long gaps in
wife working wife not working
husband working 10,936 3,981
husband not working 2,352 5,276
Table 4: Work patterns of older couples (pooled person-wave data using BHPS waves 1{13).
12health status. Longer gaps are left missing.
One important consideration aecting sample size is the number of lags of the dependent
and explanatory variables chosen for the econometric model. Due to these lags, a single
missing value may remove several years from the analysis sample. This is particularly critical
for some of the shock variables. For example when employing what turns out to be my
preferred lag structure (n = o = p = 2;q = 1), there are only 20 divorce/separation events
among women and 12 among men.5 Therefore, in addition to the just mentioned preferred
lag structure, I also use a `minimal lag structure' (i.e., n = 1;o = p = q = 0) to maximise
the eective sample size. This increases the occurrence of marital separations by 50% for
women (to 30) and by 83% for men (to 22).
The self-employed are treated in the same way as employees.
Summing up, I look at all shocks occurring between autumn 1992 or 1993 (due to the
one or two lags of the dependent variable) and spring 2004 to couples where both partners
are aged 40 to 70, where both partners were working in t   1, and where all the required
data are properly observed.
4.3 Variables
4.3.1 Dependent variable
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the sum of actual current working hours
(including overtime) and one (adding one is done to deal with zero hours). I decided to use
this specication rather than just hours in levels to reduce potential heteroskedasticity and
since it provides a better goodness of t. Using ln(h + 1) rather than any other ln(h + x)
(where x > 0) is arbitrary, but assuming x = 1 should not generate systematic biases.
5The disparity is again for several reasons: a dierent prevalence of missing values for the health and
education variables, dierential follow-up in the subsequent wave, repartnering of one of the two former
partners which means that he or she will not be treated as separated in my data.
13Taking logs also reduces second-order autocorrelation of the residuals signicantly which is
important since a violation of this assumption would render the estimator inconsistent (cf.
Arellano and Bond 1991: 278).
4.3.2 Explanatory variables
The explanatory variable of most interest to me in this paper is the shock variable which
is constructed similarly to Haurin's (1989: 56). The shock variable measures how dierent
partner's actual labour income is from partner's predicted labour income, scaled by own
labour income and household non-labour income to measure the importance of partner's
labour income for the couple as a whole.
More precisely, my shock variable  is constructed as follows:
P;t =
yP;t   ^ ycorr
P;t 1(1   ^ dR;t)
10000(yR;t + wt)
; (4)
where R and P subscripts are used to refer to respondent and partner, respectively. Labour
income is represented by y; ^ d denotes the predicted separation probability, and w household
non-labour income.
The numerator of the shock variable consists of actual labour income of the partner
minus predicted labour income of the partner, where the latter takes the predicted separation
probability into account.
The separation probability is predicted from simple logit regressions using the consoli-
dated marital, cohabitation, and fertility histories for the BHPS derived by Pronzato (2007).
The dependent variable equals `1' if the respondent had a partner in t and no partner in t+1
and `0' if the respondent had a partner in t and t+1. The explanatory variables include in-
formation on the age of the respondent and the partner, on the age dierence of the spouses,
on the wave of the BHPS, on the age of the respondent at the start of the relationship, on
14the year at the start of the relationship, on the number of children of the respondent, and
on the number of children present in the household (for details, cf. Appendix A). For these
separation regressions it is important to use only explanatory variables which are available
for almost everybody, since I do not want to restrict further the sample of my analysis.
Even though these regressions can only explain a small part of the variation in the
conditional probability of separation, I argue that this approach is superior to just using
the sex-specic separation probability observed in my regression sample, with which I also
experimented. The results of my analysis are however robust to the choice of the approach.
The denominator scales this dierence by the sum of respondent's own labour income and
household non-labour income. The denominator also contains a scaling factor, 10,000, since
this gives a reasonable range of coecient sizes. The smaller the sum of own labour income
and household non-labour income (i.e., the denominator) is, the larger will the relative eect
of the shock be.
If the respondent does not have a partner in t, yP;t is set equal to zero, rendering P;t
strictly negative.
This shock variable is dierent from the one used by B oheim and Ermisch (1999) who
analyse the eects of nancial shocks on partnership dissolution. Their shock variable com-
pares the expectation about future changes in the nancial situation expressed in t to the
retrospective evaluation of changes in the nancial situation in t + 1. Since both of these
variables only have three categories each (better o, about the same, and worse o), their
shock variable can only take ve dierent values. Moreover, the retrospective evaluation
may be subject to ex post rationalisation. Therefore, I do not use their approach.
Partner's predicted labour income ^ yP;t 1 is constructed from a regression of the following
type:
yR;t = sR;t + R;t (5)
15where sR;t is a vector of explanatory variables composed of a set of seven education dummies,
the regional unemployment rate for the respondent's sex, the number of children under the
age of 18 in the household, household size, respondent's health status, and partner's health
status. The results of these regressions are reported in Table 10 in Appendix B.
I then add to the predicted values the average residual of the corresponding person up to
the corresponding wave, i.e.,
Pt
k=1 R;k=t to yield the nal, corrected, prediction ^ ycorr
R;t which
is used in the construction of the shock variable. I interpret this average residual as the
overall inuence of unobservables on R's expected income which has been revealed up to
point t. This is based on an idea by Weiss and Willis (1997: S306) who `construct a set of
predictions of [earning capacity] for each partner conditional on available information about
the person at each year'.
I run each regression model twice, once with the overall P;t and once with ve disaggre-
gated  variables, each of which corresponds to a certain type of `event':
1. R separated or divorced between t 1 and t and no P present at t (I will from now on,
for simplicity, always use the word `separation', even though I refer to both separation
and divorce)
2. R widowed between t   1 and t and no P present at t
3. R remains partnered; P experienced health decline between t   1 and t
4. R remains partnered; P become unemployed between t   1 and t
5. none of the above four events (i.e., still with a partner|who may be somebody else
than in t   1|who remains with unchanged health and in employment between t   1
and t)
These ve events are mutually exclusive with the exception of 3 and 4 which may occur
simultaneously. This brings about the question of how to code cases where both of these
16events occur at the same time. Essentially, there are four possible ways:
 use three mutually exclusive events generated from the two not mutually exclusive
events: health decline only; unemployment only; health decline and unemployment
 code all simultaneous events as health decline only (articially made mutually exclu-
sive)
 code all simultaneous events as unemployment only (articially made mutually exclu-
sive)
 code all simultaneous events as both a health decline event and also as an unemploy-
ment event (not mutually exclusive)
Fortunately, there are surprisingly few overlaps between health events and unemployment
events. This means that the choice between the four ways how to treat simultaneous events
is not crucial: the key results were always the same when repeating my regression analysis
with all four choices. I settled with the last choice since the rst suers from the problem of
few overlaps while the second and the third are somewhat articial.
The ve event dummy variables are then interacted with P;t as dened above. The




P;t , `health shock' hl
P;t, `unemployment shock' unem
P;t , and `no event shock' noev
P;t .
From the last paragraphs it follows that only hl
P;t and unem
P;t can both be non-zero for a given
observation.
The econometric model which I use implies that the explanatory variable used is in fact
the dierence between this year's shock variable and last year's shock variable. This could in
principle lead to complications in the interpretation of the eects of the shocks. However, it
is important to keep in mind that separation, death of the partner, partner's health decline,
and partner's unemployment cannot occur twice after each other, implying that the dierence
17of each of these four shock variables will always be equal to the shock variable itself. Only
the `no event' shock can occur twice (or indeed more often) after each other.
In what follows, I will now go on to present the other explanatory variables used in my
regression analysis.
 Age squared of respondent (in years)
 State pension age dummy for respondent (1 if respondent is of or above state pension
age, 0 otherwise)
 Health dummy for respondent (1 if respondent has a health problem which limits the
type or amount of work, 0 otherwise)
 Household size
 Number of children under the age of 18 in the household
 Home ownership (one dummy for outright owners and one for owners with a current
mortgage or loan; base category are non-owners)
 Household non-labour income
 Shock variable(s) P (as detailed before)
In terms of the classication into strictly exogenous variables, non-endogenous predeter-
mined variables, and endogenous predetermined variables mentioned earlier on, all of the
above-mentioned variables are assumed to be strictly exogenous, except for household size
and number of children (both non-endogenous predetermined) as well as the two home own-
ership dummy variables and household non-labour income (all endogenous predetermined).
There are some theoretical arguments for this classication. The three age variables are
clearly exogenous. The health variable could be subject to some ex post rationalisation, but
18since strictly objective measures are not available in the BHPS and are subject to criticism,
too, I assume my health variable to be exogenous as well.6 The shock variable(s) is (are)
subject to the same assumption. Household size and the number of children are clearly not
exogenous since they are subject to choice within the household, but can be taken as given at
the beginning of any time period which is why I assume these variables to be non-endogenous
predetermined. Home ownership and household non-labour income, on the other hand, are
certainly endogenous since their value is a result of past labour supply and income. This
classication is also supported by the results of the Sargan test.
I use the squared value of age, divided by 1000. Furthermore, I also use a state pension
age dummy variable which equals 1 if age is larger than or equal to 60 (for women) or 65
(for men). This is due to the fact that the UK state pension can be drawn starting from this
age and there is no employment protection or redundancy pay beyond that age, forming a
strong incentive to withdraw from the labour market as shown by Haardt (2006). The state
pension dummy therefore enables a shift of the age-prole of the dependent variable at age
65 (for men) or 60 (for women).
I also experimented with age in levels, and with the logarithm of age. The former has
the problem that since the Arellano-Bond model is a dierence model, aget   aget 1 = 1
for approx. 88% of observations, and is only identied through observation pairs where
the two interview dates (usually September to May) and the birthday interact in unusual
ways. If, for instance, somebody who has his or her birthday in October is interviewed in
September in wave t   1 and in May in wave t, we will observe aget   aget 1 = 2. Since
age may therefore capture mere seasonality rather than a genuine age eect, I ran all the
regressions twice, once with age in levels and once without age in levels. The key results,
in particular the coecients of the shock variables, were not too dierent but in general the
6Bound (1991) suggests that neither objective nor subjective health variables provide reliable results for
the eects of health on labour market outcomes. However, his results also suggest that objective health
variables provide a lower bound and subjective health variables an upper bound of the true eect.
19model fared better without the age variable which is why I will, later on, only report those
results. Experiments with ln(age) were not very successful either.
The health dummy variable comes from the following question in the BHPS interview:
Does your health limit the type of work or the amount of work you can do? I recode this
variable so that 1 corresponds to yes and 0 to no. This variable has virtually no missing cases
but, unfortunately, was not asked in wave 9 of the BHPS. Therefore, I use linear interpolation
to ll gaps which are one wave long (which aects virtually only wave 9): if the same answer
was given before and after the gap, this answer is imputed for the gap. If dierent answers
were given, a value of 0.5 is imputed.
Household size and number of children under the age of 18 in the household are derived
variables included in the BHPS release.7 The probability that a couple in this age group has
children present in the household is only about one fth but I still include the variable.
The home ownership dummy variables, one for outright ownership and one for mortgage-
based ownership, are used as proxies for wealth. The base category are non-owners. My
dummy variables are generated from a categorical variable on housing tenure which the
BHPS provides.8
Household non-labour income is the same variable as used in the denominator of the
shock variable(s). It is the sum of last month's household transfer income and household
investment income, two derived variables present in the BHPS.9 These variables include
approx. 15{35% imputed data. I divide it by 10,000 to rescale the variable.
Finally, the regional claimant count rate of the respondent's sex is used as an additional
instrument; the underlying assumption is that the regional unemployment rate aects some
7Variables wHHSIZE and wNKIDS on the wHHRESP le.
8Variable wTENURE on wHHRESP.
9Variables wFIHHMT and wFIHHMI on the wHHRESP le. My variable is therefore not equivalent
to the BHPS variable household non-labour income, wFIHHMNL, which also includes pension and benet
income. I do not consider pension and benet income since my interest is only in the couple, not in others
in the household who may receive pension or benet income but who do not necessarily pool their income
with the couple.
20of the explanatory variables but not working hours directly. These data come from Na-
tional Statistics for the 12 standard UK regions: East, East Midlands, London, North East,
Northern Ireland, Northwest and Merseyside, Scotland, Southeast, Southwest, Wales, West
Midlands, and Yorkshire and Humberside.10 Since information on the region of residence
is available in the BHPS with the categories, I am able to merge these unemployment data
into the BHPS. I use the sex-dependent time series without seasonal adjustment.
I also wanted to include other variables but was not able to do so for various reasons.
First, I would have liked to include information about individuals' employment history (for
instance the percentage of years working when the respondent was 15 to 40 years old),
but since I am using dierenced regressions the eects of time-constant variables are not
identied. Second, I would have liked to include information on job tenure as Haurin did,
but information on when the current job started is often missing. It would have been
highly interesting to use information on the reasons for quitting a job to distinguish between
voluntary and involuntary exits from or changes of employment, but these data are missing
for approx. 35{40% of applicable cases which would have caused strong sample selection.
Lastly, I also experimented with information on hours preferences (for similar reasons), but
was not able to get reasonable results (the dummy variables for preferring more or less
working hours were either insignicant or had the same sign).
In Table 5, I present the means of the dependent and explanatory variables for my four
regression samples, rst the two samples where I analyse the impact of husband's (partner's)
shock on wife's (respondent) labour supply and then the two opposite samples. In both cases
there is one column for the (smaller) sample with the preferred lag structure (PLS) and one
10The corresponding time series are DPAH (men) and DPAI (women) for the UK, ZMOL and ZMON
for the East, ZMOP and ZMOR for London, ZMOT and ZMOV for the Southeast, ZMOX and ZMOZ for
the Southwest, ZMPB and ZMPD for the East Midlands, ZMPF and ZMPH for the West Midlands, ZMPJ
and ZMPL for the Northeast, ZMPV and ZMPX for the Northwest and Merseyside, ZMPZ and ZMQB for
Yorkshire and Humberside, ZMQL and ZMQN for England, ZMQH and ZMQJ for Scotland, ZMQD and
ZMQF for Wales, and ZMQP and ZMQR for Northern Ireland.
21Variable H!W PLS H!W MLS W!H PLS W!H MLS
R hours 29.1934 29.3582 42.8156 42.8999
Household size 2.9392 2.9980 2.9474 2.9980
Number of children 0.2214 0.2816 0.2228 0.2798
Home owner (outright) 0.2717 0.2529 0.2756 0.2545
Home owner (mortgage) 0.6325 0.6499 0.6334 0.6485
HH non-labour income 145.4430 140.4280 146.1750 139.4450
R of state pension age (SPA) 0.0685 0.0627 0.0291 0.0280
R health problem 0.1149 0.1139 0.0938 0.0943
R's age (in years) 51.6330 50.9886 53.5922 52.9543
Person-years 3,788 5,032 3,755 4,987
Persons 974 1,257 985 1,248
Table 5: Means of the explanatory variables, excluding the shock variables, in the four
regression samples (PLS: preferred lag structure; MLS: minimal lag structure). Household
non-labour income is measured in January 2004 pounds per month.
for the (larger) sample with the minimal lag structure.
From Table 5 we learn that the women in our sample are on average working 29 hours
per week and the men 43 (keep in mind that my analysis is restricted to couples in which
both spouses were working in t   1, and that these gures are actual total hours, including
overtime). We can also see that people with less regular response patterns are more likely to
have children in the household, to have a lower level of household non-labour income, and
to be younger (since the PLS samples involve stronger conditioning on response in several
subsequent years of the survey than the MLS samples). However, I did not test for inequality
of the means.
Table 6 shows the means and medians of the shock variables. It can be seen that the
average nancial impact caused by wife's death unemployment is huge. This is due to one
observation each in which the shock is very large and negative. Since these two observations
look genuine, I do not drop them. Having said that, it is not surprising that the medians
(in the lower panel) show much more regular patterns than the means. More than 50% (in
fact, many more) of separations, of unemployment events, and of deaths are associated with
22Variable H!W PLS H!W MLS W!H PLS W!H MLS
Means
P's overall shock  0.3978  0.1936  0.2241  0.0155
P's separation shock  3.1448  2.3891  0.0466  0.0691
P's no event shock  0.3827  0.1733 0.6208 0.6308
P's health shock  0.1186  0.1669 0.0182 0.0250
P's unemployment shock  0.7834  0.6078  34.6746  28.7769
P's death (widowhood) shock  0.1363  0.1662  284.6366  243.9842
Medians
P's overall shock 0.0113 0.0098 0.0042 0.0040
P's separation shock  0.1833  0.1638  0.0423  0.0463
P's no event shock 0.0121 0.0105 0.0043 0.0041
P's health shock  0.0004  0.0008 0.0026 0.0026
P's unemployment shock  0.1713  0.1551  0.0485  0.0410
P's death (widowhood) shock  0.0742  0.0930  0.0555  0.0698
Person-years 3,780 5,022 3,748 4,967
Persons 968 1,250 981 1,237
Table 6: Means (upper panel) and medians (lower panel) of the shock variables in the
four regression samples; all values x1,000 (PLS: preferred lag structure; MLS: minimal lag
structure).
negative income shocks. On the other hand, more than 50% of the `no event' shocks and
of the health shocks are associated with positive income shocks. This is also true for the
aggregate shock measure. The fact that partner's income is higher than expected when the
partner experiences a health shock is however not necessarily surprising given that health
is one of the predictors in the labour income regressions. This means that directly after
experiencing a health shock the income shock has not yet reached its nal level.
How does my specication compare to that of Haurin? Apart from the fact that Haurin
analyses hours shocks while I analyse income shocks, he also uses city size dummy variables
(which are not available in the BHPS) and assets (which I do not use because these data
are not very detailed in the BHPS). I use information on home ownership and household
non-labour income instead of assets which should be closely related. I include a state pension
age dummy variable in the hours regressions (the `second stage') while Haurin uses one in
23the wage regressions (the `rst stage'). As a side remark, I use household size rather than
the number of others in the household (the latter is equal to the former minus two minus
the number of children).
There are several dierences as far as the auxiliary regressions (labour income regressions
in my case, wage regressions in the case of Haurin) are concerned. These can be studied in
more detail by comparing Table 10 in Appendix B to Table 2 in Haurin (1989: 58). Two
dierences worth mentioning are that I use education dummies rather than years of schooling
(since the latter is not that meaningful in a UK context) and that I do not include race since
there is only a rather small proportion of ethnic minorities in the BHPS and since there
is a larger heterogeneity among ethnic minorities in the UK than in the US. Finally, since
correcting for selection gave a slightly worse t while complicating the model, my labour
income regressions are not selection corrected. In my work as well as in his, the education




In this section, I present and discuss the results of my regression analysis. Table 7 shows the
estimated eects of husbands' shocks on wives, Table 8 the other way around.
5.2 Results for the shock variables
The aggregate shock variables, not distinguishing by the cause of the shock, are not very
precisely estimated. If anything, we can say that there is a slight tendency towards synchro-
nisation of labour supply (meaning a positive sign of the coecient). This tendency towards
24H's shock(s) Preferred lag structure Minimal lag structure
! W's ln(hours) Overall Disaggr. Overall Disaggr.
LD.(Dep. Var.)  0:1555***  0:1513***  0:1100***  0:1084***
L2D.(Dep. Var.)  0:0214  0:0196
D.(HH size)  0:0326  0:0402 0:0100 0:0078
LD.(HH size)  0:0092  0:0024
L2D.(HH size)  0:1082*  0:1116*
D.(No. of children)  0:0410  0:0473  0:3940***  0:3903***
LD.(No. of children)  0:4992***  0:5117***
L2D.(No. of children) 0:0298 0:0483
D.(OR home owner) 0:3213 0:4155 0:9248*** 0:9692***
LD.(OR home owner) 1:1800*** 1:0238***
D.(MG home owner) 0:0753 0:0705 0:8163*** 0:7823***
LD.(MG home owner) 1:5281*** 1:4128***
D.(HH NL income) 3:4095*** 3:2819*** 1:2048 1:1163
LD.(HH NL income) 0:6541 0:7013
D.(W of SPA (60+))  0:7100***  0:7158***  0:7772***  0:7793***
D.(W health prob.) 0:0020  0:0104 0:0033  0:0066
LD.(W health prob.)  0:1501***  0:1674***
L2D.(W health prob.)  0:0490  0:0525
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H ) 49:1681  505:0716
Constant  0:1385***  0:1443***  0:0934**  0:0971**
Number of obs 3780 3780 5022 5022
Sargan test 0:5991 0:5139 0:6339 0:6618
AB test (order 1) 0:0488 0:0376 0:0000 0:0000
AB test (order 2) 0:4591 0:2816 0:4745 0:3715
Table 7: Regression coecients for Husband's shock(s)! Wife's ln(hours).
D = rst dierence; LD = lagged dierence; L2D = second lag of the dierence.
***: Stat. signicant at 1% level; **: 5% level; *: 10% level; +: 15% level.
25W's shock(s) Preferred lag structure Minimal lag structure
! H's ln(hours) Overall Disaggr. Overall Disaggr.
LD.(Dep. Var.)  0:2505***  0:2534***  0:1764***  0:1777***
L2D.(Dep. Var.)  0:0810***  0:0819***
D.(HH size)  0:0750  0:0470  0:1588***  0:1526***
LD.(HH size) 0:0443 0:0312
L2D.(HH size)  0:1012*  0:1090*
D.(No. of children) 0:0121 0:0184  0:0320  0:0361
LD.(No. of children) 0:3556** 0:3228**
L2D.(No. of children)  0:3872***  0:3750***
D.(OR home owner) 0:1194 0:2190 0:5201** 0:5549**
LD.(OR home owner) 0:6039+ 0:5879+
D.(MG home owner) 0:2206 0:3427 0:7089*** 0:7560***
LD.(MG home owner) 0:6840** 0:6377*
D.(HH NL income) 2:6112** 2:5114** 1:4142+ 1:3841+
LD.(HH NL income)  0:2511  0:2965
D.(H of SPA (65+))  1:4989***  1:5105***  1:6191***  1:6210***
D.(H health prob.)  0:1744***  0:1696***  0:1609***  0:1574***
LD.(H health prob.)  0:2160***  0:2103***
L2D.(H health prob.)  0:0417  0:0370
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W )  0:0079 0:0517
Constant  0:0556  0:0600  0:0192  0:0243
Number of obs 3748 3748 4967 4967
Sargan test 0:5493 0:5463 0:6101 0:6107
AB test (order 1) 0:0000 0:0000 0:0000 0:0000
AB test (order 2) 0:8581 0:7902 0:2479 0:2227
Table 8: Regression coecients for Wife's shock(s)! Husband's ln(hours).
D = rst dierence; LD = lagged dierence; L2D = second lag of the dierence.
***: Stat. signicant at 1% level; **: 5% level; *: 10% level; +: 15% level.
26synchronisation is linked to Table 4 earlier on, which showed that there are more couples in
which either both spouses work or no spouse works than couples in which only one spouse
works.
The results become more pronounced and more interesting when disaggregating the ag-
gregate shock variables into the ve separate shock variables.
The coecient of husband's separation shock variable is positive and highly statistically
signicant using both lag structures. This means that women who experience a negative
income shock due to a separation decrease their labour supply. If a woman was working 29
hours per week (the rounded sample mean, as mentioned earlier on), then the hours decrease
caused by the average separation shock size will be 6 hours (to 23) when using the preferred
lag structure or 5 hours (to 24) when using the minimal lag structure.11 Looking in the other
direction, the coecients are always negative and, in the case of the minimal lag structure,
also statistically signicant at the 5% level, implying that husbands upon separation tend to
increase their labour supply. If we use the minimal lag structure, in which this coecient is
statistically signicant, and consider a man who initially worked 43 hours per week (again,
the rounded sample mean), then the hours increase caused by the average separation shock
size equals 17 (to 60 hours per week).
The health shock variable is consistently positive for the eect of men on women, imply-
ing that wives reduce their working hours when their husband simultaneously experiences a
negative income shock and a health decline. When looking again at a woman who initially
worked 29 hours, the contemporaneous eect predicts an hours decrease caused by the av-
erage health shock size of approx. one hour regardless of the lag structure. However, even
though this eect looks small, one should not forget that the adjustment process appears to
11To obtain these and the following gures throughout this section, consider the following equations:
exp[ln(29+1)+( 0:003144868:0847)] 1 = 23:22 and exp[ln(29+1)+( 0:002389173:2804)] 1 = 24:18.
The addition of 1 when forming the logarithm as well as the subtraction of 1 at the end stem from the fact
that I dene my dependent variable in terms of ln(hours+1) to deal with zero hours.
27take several years since the coecients of both the rst and second lags of the dierence are
also statistically signicant. The total eect, therefore, is a reduction of labour supply by a
bit more than three hours per week. Looking in the other direction, at the eects of wife's
health shock on husband's hours, there seems to be an opposite tendency for husbands to
increase rather than reduce their working hours when their wife simultaneously experiences
income and health shocks. This can be seen from the negative and statistically signicant
coecient when using the minimal lag structure. However, the average size of this shock is
in fact actually positive, as discussed earlier on. The size of the eect is very small: using the
average (positive) shock size, there is virtually no change in husband's labour supply. The
asymmetry in the health shock eect, i.e., that the coecients are of opposite sign, could
for instance be explained by dierent patterns of caregiving (i.e., wives providing caregiving
for husbands with health problems, but not vice versa). However, in this paper, I do not
provide empirical evidence for such a potential explanation.
The unemployment shock appears to aect women similarly as the separation and health
shocks: positive sign (possibly indicating, as discussed in the literature review in the intro-
duction, a disincentive eect of the benet system and/or a DWE) and not too dierent
size. Applying the average unemployment shock on a woman working 29 hours leads to a
predicted reduction of 3 hours in wife's hours when using the preferred lag structure and
of 2.5 hours when using the minimal lag structure. In the other direction, there are no
statistically signicant eects, and the coecient size is also very small.
The eects of partner's death are never statistically signicant and do not show any clear
pattern. The coecient size is much larger for women than for men, implying that women's
labour market reaction to widowhood is noticeable (but not well determined) while men's is
virtually nonexistent. Of course the analysis also suers from low case numbers since death
of a partner is by far the most infrequent of the events used.
The eect of a `no event' shock, that is an unexpected income change brought about
28without separation, death, unemployment, or health change of the partner (this means that
such a `no event' shock could be for instance due to choice or due to a promotion) is hardly
statistically signicant but generally speaking positive (the only statistically signicant `no
event' shock is the contemporaneous eect of the husband's shock on wife's hours in the
preferred lag structure model). It is fair to say that the results for the no event shock are
not too dierent from those for the overall shock variable discussed a couple of paragraphs
ago. This can, as already mentioned, point in several directions: it could be that this
phenomenon is due to choice and the complementarity of leisure, but it could also be that
we are actually observing the disincentive eects of the benet system and/or a discouraged
worker eect. In any case the results for the no event shock are not very well determined,
and small in size.
I also tested for equality of the coecients of the disaggregated shock variables. In
particular, the eects of the separation, health, and unemployment shocks on women's hours
appear to be rather similar. However, statistical tests indicate that only the eects of
husband's health and unemployment shocks on wife's hours in the preferred lag specication
are found to be equal to each other at a reasonable error margin (2% in this case). No
other two shock variable coecients are found to equal each other at a 20% or lower level.
Therefore, the rather detailed disaggregation used is worthwhile.
Finally, I would also like to compare my ndings about the eects of the shocks to those
of Haurin (1989). The only statistically signicant shock eect which Haurin found was
an increase in wife's labour supply after a divorce or separation. Recall that the size of
this increase in Haurin's paper, starting from an annual hours mean of 960, was 540 hours.
Assuming two weeks o (since he uses US data), this translates into an increase by 10.8
hours per week from 19.2 to 30 hours per week. Looking at my results for the UK, the
corresponding gures, as mentioned earlier on, are a decrease by 5{6 hours per week from 29
to 23{24 hours per week. This contrast in the direction of the eect can be seen as consistent
29with the dierences between Britain and the USA with respect to AWE versus DWE found
in the more general literature on couples in which the husband becomes unemployed, as
outlined in the introduction of this paper.
5.3 Results for the control variables
The number of children in the household shows a strong asymmetry: there is, over time, no
well-determined eect in either direction on husband's working hours, but a clear negative
eect on wife's working hours. In other words, other things being equal, women raise their
labour supply after a child leaves the household (and reduce it after a child is born into the
household, which is of course less important in this age group). The size of this eect is large:
considering again a wife who worked 29 hours per week, the predicted hours increase after
a child leaves the household is approx. 19.5 (to 48.5) when using the preferred lag structure
and 14.5 (to 43.5) when using the minimal lag structure. However, average working hours
among women with children are likely to be lower than among those without.
The coecients of the home ownership variables reveal that one year after buying a
house, both partners increase their working hours, other things being equal. As one may
have expected, the eect is stronger for owners with a current mortgage or loan than for
outright owners, and more pronounced for wives than for husbands. However, even though
there are quite a lot of changes in ownership status (i.e., there is no problem of small case
numbers), the eect sizes are implausibly large, especially for the eect on the wife. When
becoming owners with a current mortgage or loan, a husband previously working 43 hours
per week is predicted to increase his weekly working hours by 39 to 43 (to 82{86). When
becoming outright homeowners, the predicted increase in husband's working hours is 35 to
36 hours (to 78{79). Looking at the wife, the predicted hours increase caused by becoming
owners with a current mortgage or loan is 93 to 109 hours per week (to 122{138). When
becoming outright homeowners, the eect on the wife is 53 to 68 hours (to 82{97). Again,
30it may of course be that average working hours before such a change are lower than overall.
If household non-labour income increases, wives increase their labour supply. The source
of this eect is not immediately clear, but the eect is small yet statistically signicant
(starting from its mean value, a 50% increase in household non-labour income will cause a
woman who previously worked 29 hours per week to work approx. two thirds of an hour
more). It should be kept in mind that a change in household non-labour income also aects
the denominator of the shock variables.
Not very surprisingly, reaching state pension age is associated with a substantial down-
ward shift of the age-hours schedule. For a man who worked 43 hours per week the eect
of this variable alone predicts a decrease by 34 hours to 9 hours per week when turning 65
(using the preferred lag structure). Using the minimal lag structure the decrease is even
larger: by 35 hours to just 8 hours. For a woman working 29 hours, the predicted hours
reduction explained by turning 60 is 15.5 (to 13.5) when using the preferred lag structure
or 16 (to 13) when using the minimal lag structure. These huge eects are in accord with
research on the labour market transitions of older men and women in the UK (cf. Haardt
2006: Figures 2, 18, and 20 on pp. 19, 36, and 37).
An own health decline reduces working hours, but not by as much as one would have
expected. The husband's own health eect is very well determined. Considering again a
husband who worked 43 hours per week, the predicted hours reduction equals 7 (to 36 hours
per week) when using the preferred lag structure or 6.5 (to 36.5 hours per week) when using
the minimal lag structure. The wife's own health eect is only statistically signicant when
using the preferred lag structure and comes with a one-lag delay. If a wife working 29 hours
per week experiences a health decline, she will reduce her working hours by 4 hours (to 25)
when using only one shock variable or by 4.5 hours (to 24.5) when disaggregating the shock
variable. However, it should be kept in mind that I do not use nely graded data on health
in this paper. Larger eects may have been found if I had used separate variables for very
31large health declines.
6 Summary and conclusions
In this paper, I analysed how spouses in older couples react to `shocks' or `surprises' in their
partner's labour income using data from the British Household Panel Survey, 1991{2004.
To this end, I build upon the work of Haurin (1989) who used US data from 1981 and 1982
to analyse the eects of husband's income shocks caused by underlying hours shocks on the
labour supply of wives of all ages. Apart from the dierent shock measure, the fact that
I use more recent British data, and the fact that I focus on people aged 40 to 70, I also
look at the inuence of wife's shocks on husband's hours. Furthermore, I am able to model
dynamic adjustment processes in working hours in a more comprehensive way by using the
Arellano-Bond (1991) GMM methodology which was not yet available when Haurin wrote
his article.
As expected, I nd that wives' labour supply is much more sensitive to partner's shocks
than husbands'. In fact, husband's labour supply seems to be aected by only two of the
types of shocks considered, by a separation shock, and by a health shock of the partner.
Other unexpected changes in wife's income are not found to be statistically signicant.
After a separation, wives reduce their labour supply while the eect on husbands' labour
supply is less well-determined (not statistically signicant or positive). A woman whose
initial labour supply equalled the regression sample mean (29 hours per week) is predicted
to reduce her labour supply by 5{6 hours to 23{24 hours per week. This is opposite to
Haurin's results who found that for the US in the early 80s, divorce or separation lead to
an increase in women's labour supply. My results also predict that husbands who initially
worked 43 hours per week (again the regression sample mean) will increase their labour
supply by 17 hours to 60 hours per week upon separation. However, this eect is only
32statistically signicant in one of two lag structures used.
Wife's unemployment does not have a statistically signicant eect on husband's labour
supply while wives whose husband becomes unemployed reduce their labour supply, too.
Here, the predicted reduction is by 2.5{3 hours to 26{26.5 hours per week.
Partner's health decline causes wives to reduce their working hours while husbands tend
to increase theirs when facing the opposite situation. The contemporaneous eect on a
woman who used to work 29 hours per week is a reduction by one hour, but the eect
appears to be spread out over several years with a cumulative eect of a reduction by 3 or
more hours (to 26 or less hours per week). If anything, negative income shocks due to wife's
bad health appear to increase husband's labour supply.
The eects of widowhood and widowerhood are not very well determined and in the
latter case also negligibly small. None of the coecients is statistically signicant at any
reasonable level.
Negative (positive) income shocks of the partner due to other reasons (such as choice)
tend to reduce (increase) labour supply, but only slightly. The coecient size is very small.
Even though the divorce or separation shock was the only statistically signicant shock
type in Haurin's analysis, one can draw out broader implications of the comparison between
the US and the UK: in the US, there seems to be a clear tendency towards income replacement
when looking at the eect on wife's hours, whatever the cause of the negative income shock
of the husband (i.e., an osetting reaction), while in the UK, only the husband seems to
respond according to this pattern (if at all) while the wife always `follows' the direction
of the husband's income shock regardless of its cause (i.e., a magnifying reaction).12 This
suggests that the household-level consequences of husband's income shocks are larger in the
12This is shown by the fact that all the statistically signicant shock coecients in my analysis are positive
when looking at the eects on wives and negative when looking at the eects on husbands; when comparing
my results to Haurin (1989), keep in mind that his dependent variable is dened in terms of leisure rather
than in terms of work.
33UK than in the US.
I am reluctant though to speculate about the possible consequences of the future increase
of women's state pension age on husbands' labour supply. Such a policy change is substantial
in magnitude as well as fully anticipated and permanent, and therefore may be very dierent
from the kinds of shocks I analysed in this paper.
As far as the other explanatory variables are considered, a couple of results are worth
reiterating. First, the presence of children reduces wives' labour supply considerably. Second,
home ownership, especially ownership with a current mortgage or loan, increases the labour
supply of both spouses substantially. Third, there is an enormous impact of reaching state
pension age which is in line with research on older people's labour market transitions. Fourth
and last, the presence of a health problem reduces one's own labour supply, but not by as
much as one may have expected.
Naturally, a lot of work remains to be done. One particularly interesting aspect, as
mentioned in the introduction of this paper, would be a decomposition of my income shock
variable into the income shock caused by an hours change (as in Haurin) and the income
shock caused by a wage change. When analysing the eects of separation, and, even more
so, of widowhood and widowerhood, one cannot emphasise enough the importance of (even)
larger panels. Even specialised data sets such as the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing
(ELSA) would not be able to provide a larger sample size than I was able to use in this
paper. The future UK Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS) may provide a large enough
sample size even for rare events such as death. Finally, it will remain important to investigate
further the exact causal mechanisms behind the spousal interactions found in this paper.
34Appendix A: Separation regressions
R separated R = male R = female
R's age 1:4540 1:3832
R's age squared 0:0326 0:2104
P's age 0:6684 0:7135+
P's age squared 21:5021 12:3969
Husband at least 5 yrs older than wife 1:6820 1:3551





Age of R at start of relationship 0:9250 0:8075
Age of R at start of relationship squared 1:0001 1:0001
Year at start of relationship 1:0487 1:2158
R has one kid 4:8833   1:5013
R has 2 kids 3:3396 1:4276
R has 3 kids 3:8883   1:4174
R has 4 or more kids 3:2986 1:4661
Number of kids in the household 1:0377 1:0553
Number of observations 18;009 18;439
Pseudo R-squared 0:0791 0:0492
Log likelihood  512:0820  639:9328
Table 9: Odds ratios of the separation logit (dependent variable equals 1 if R separated
between t   1 and t and is without partner in t).
***: Stat. signicant at 1% level; **: 5% level; *: 10% level; +: 15% level.
35Appendix B: Labour income regressions
Husbands Wives
R has degree 1029.8730*** 889.9460***
R has teaching qual. 200.3199*** 548.0318***
R has other higher qual. 459.3972*** 392.3119***
R has nursing qual. 112.4810 329.0929***
R has A levels 267.0934*** 223.2863***
R has O levels 210.8050*** 155.5519***
R has other vocational qual. 155.7274*** 96.0080***
R's age 143.7684*** 48.0894***
R's squared age/1000  1779.8480***  -716.6486***
Regional unemployment rate for men  39.6510***  46.6171***
R has health problem  583.7513***  250.6256***
P has health problem  131.9625***  54.1034***
Number of children in HH 11.6350  106.3363***
HH size 45.3694***  23.3564***
Constant  1253.0860*** 105.5838
Number of observations 20,928 21,597
Adjusted R-squared 0.2254 0.2883
Table 10: Last month's labour income regressions, pooled BHPS data (base qualication:
no qualication).
***: Statistically signicant at the 1% level; **: 5% level; *: 10% level.
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